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Abstract: We do not know; but simplistic answers to the title’s question should be mistrusted. In this 
paper, we first provide a literature overview, laying out the vast diversity of theories on the role of 
monetary aspects for economic growth both within mainstream growth theory and within heterodox 
perspectives. In fact, completely contradicting results have been derived from a variety of reasonable 
theories. Based on this literature survey, we explore the narrative background of the most prominent 
theories as each of them is related to and justified by a distinct narrative. For instance, mainstream growth 
textbooks are based on the assumption that “money is a neutral medium of exchange” while other 
approaches hold that “zero interest rates are a precondition for a stationary economy”. We show how these 
narratives—though they may well contain some truth—lend themselves to serve as myths, which rather 
inhibit than facilitate our understanding of the complex relationship between monetary variables and 
economic growth. Finally, we discuss consequences for the degrowth debate in terms of practical 
proposals for overcoming assumed growth imperatives as well as theoretical consequences. 
 
“You see, circulation is everything. The money goes around, creating wealth as it does so.”  
T. Pratchett (2008, p. 387) 
“If, however, we are tempted to assert that money is the drink which stimulates the system to activity,  
we must remind ourselves that there may be several slips between the cup and the lip.”  
J.M. Keynes (1936, p. 173) 
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1. Introduction 
Money, interest and debt are three interlinked economic concepts whose role for economic growth is 
increasingly debated within the degrowth movement. In the wake of the subprime crisis, the monetary 
drivers of capitalist growth dynamics have been repeatedly called a crucial, yet understudied issue (e.g., 
Martínez-Alier et al., 2010). In consequence, numerous proposals have been put forward as possible keys 
to overcoming the perceived monetary triggers of growth: For instance, we are advised to “occupy 
money” by creating interest-free currency, thereby reclaiming money from “exclusive private interests” 
(Kennedy, 2012, p. xv). Furthermore, proposals for alternative financial systems, which have been 
hovering around at least since the Great Recession of the 1930s, such as complementary regional 
currencies (Douthwaite, 2012; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013) or 100% money (for a review, cf. Dittmer, 
2015), are currently resurging. 
Yet, a closer look at the literature reveals that monetary aspects occupy a somewhat peculiar position in 
theories about (de)growth. To date, there is no consensus as to whether monetary factors can trigger real 
economic growth and if so, in what way and to what extent. There is not even consensus about what 
money is and what counts as “monetary factors”. Some theories treat money, interest and debt as 
irrelevant for the real economy, whereas others claim either all or only one of them to be pivotal. 
Interestingly, the cleavage does not align with the usual mainstream-heterodox divide: some heterodox 
scholars have proposed the existence of a monetary growth imperative of some form (Heinsohn and 
Steiger, 2013; Loehr, 2012; Binswanger, 2012; Wenzlaff et al., 2014). Others, both within mainstream 
economic theory and heterodox schools of thought, deny this possibility (e.g., Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie 
2014). And while mainstream textbooks do not present monetary aspects as fundamental drivers of 
economic growth, this does not really reflect the actual complexity of debates within mainstream 
monetary economics (cf. Orphanides and Solow, 1990). The puzzle then is: what should the appropriate 
place of monetary aspects in a critique of capitalist growth dynamics be?  
In our contribution we shed some light on the issue of whether there exists a monetary growth imperative 
that a post-growth society would have to somehow overcome. The initial question, therefore, reads: what 
is a growth imperative? In the papers and books we analyze below, this concept is seldom explicitly 
defined or thoroughly discussed. Implicitly, it seems that a growth imperative is something that “forces” 
the modern economy to grow, in accordance with the English meaning of the word “imperative”, which 
implies necessity (Oxford Thesaurus, 1991). In fact, Binswanger (2012) explicitly distinguishes between 
growth imperative (a seemingly unavoidable mechanism embedded in the structure of the economy which 
makes the latter grow, without there being a viable alternative option, viz., not to grow) and growth 
impetus (a mechanism that incentivizes growth, but which does not “punish” not growing). In order to 
assess the theoretical case for such a growth imperative, we first critically review the most prominent 
concepts in the related literature—the neoclassical analyses of the influence of money on real economic 
growth, Keynesian or Keynes-inspired perspectives on the problem, the “growth spiral” model of 
capitalist production and debt-centered theories of money, interest and growth. Subsequently, we compare 
these major theoretical approaches with respect to the logical and historical plausibility of their main 
narratives.  
Two main results of this systematic assessment are that i) very different conclusions can be reached 
regarding the (non-)existence of monetary growth imperatives. Indeed, contradictory results may be 
derived from similarly plausible assumptions. ii) From an empirical perspective it is impossible to single 
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out one theory as most convincing. Yet despite this diversity of plausible views, the analysis provides a 
strong “meta-result”: the simplest propositions on the link between monetary variables and growth are, at 
the same time, the least compelling. 
Against this background, we discuss the consequences for the current degrowth debate. In particular, the 
analysis casts doubt on the merits of proposals such as interest-free or debt-free money. Therefore, simple 
advice on the question which policy steers best towards a post-growth financial system remains elusive. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a systematic overview of 
theories on the money-growth nexus. Section 3 investigates how each of these theories is linked to specific 
narratives. In Section 4, we discuss the consequences of these analyses both for the degrowth movement 
and for further theory development. 
2. Overview: do growth and degrowth theories include monetary aspects—if so, how? 
2.1. Monetary aspects as (mostly) irrelevant 
"Money has always been something of an embarrassment to economic theory. Everyone agrees that it is 
important; indeed, much of macroeconomic policy discussion makes no sense without reference to money. 
Yet, for the most part theory fails to provide a good account for it. Indeed, in the best developed model of 
a competitive economy—the Arrow-Debreu [1954] framework—there is no role for money at all. Rather 
than there being a medium of exchange, prices are quoted in terms of a fictitious unit of account, agents 
trade at those prices, and that is the end of the story." (Banerjee and Maskin, 1996, p. 955) 
Thus reads the opening paragraph of a paper delivering a “Walrasian theory of money”. This quote also 
happens to nicely summarize the status of money in standard growth theory.  
When money is considered in mainstream economic models at all, the starting point is usually to look at 
the functions money performs for economic agents. In particular, three functions are highlighted: money is 
supposed to serve as 1) medium of exchange, 2) store of value and 3) unit of account. The first function 
directly relates to the origins of money, as argued by, amongst others, Jones (1976), Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1989), Banerjee and Maskin (1996) and Luo (1998)1. Similarly, Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) focus 
on money as a “lubricant”, that is, as a means to reduce the transaction costs of trading. Second, money 
can serve as a store of value. This function is highlighted in Samuelson’s (1958) overlapping-generations 
model, in which money facilitates the reallocation of resources across generations. Third, money is used 
as a unit of account, that is, as a standard of measurement. For instance, Doepke and Schneider (2013) 
provide a model explaining money’s role as a unit of account for future payments. 
Particularly the first view of money as a medium of exchange sets the stage for the negligent treatment of 
money in specific theories of economic growth: it lends itself to justify the assumption that money is 
neutral—which means that nominal variables (i.e., those measured in monetary units) do not affect the 
real variables (i.e., those measured in physical units) that actually determine the economy. “This silence 
[of growth theory on money] is understandable because a basic theoretical paradigm focuses on the 
fundamental mechanisms of the growth process, whereas finance is like the lubrication that reduces 
friction and thereby enables the machinery to function” (Aghion and Howitt, 2009, p. 129). The presumed 
fundamental mechanisms, e.g., technological progress and its constitutive factors such as R&D and patent 
1 Conversely, in his account of money’s history, Davies (2002) identifies many more functions of money, ranging from economic 
to social. 
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laws, individual preferences and scarcity of resources (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 2009; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004; Romer, 1990; Solow, 1956), are, crucially, regarded as long-term issues. That is, they 
determine the level of an economy’s steady-state by directly affecting marginal productivity of capital. In 
the steady state, net investments are no longer relevant for growth because the depreciation rate has kept 
up with capital productivity. 
In contrast, monetary aspects are considered as short-run phenomena, as possible frictions that may slow 
down or support economic processes along the growth-path towards the steady state. Money does not 
affect the final level of output. In other words, common wisdom among economists says that money is 
neutral in the long-run but not in the short-run (e.g., Mankiw, 2009, p. 684). More technically, neutrality 
of money is defined as follows: a one-time change in money supply does not alter the real variables of an 
economy and only affects the price level. In dynamic contexts, the stronger concept of super-neutrality 
becomes relevant, meaning that a change in the growth rate of money supply leaves real variables 
unaltered. In its strongest version, in what is also called the “classical dichotomy”2, neutrality of money 
implies a complete separation of nominal and real variables.3 The dominant view, however, provides 
scope for monetary policy during short-run economic fluctuations and sees no role for money as a long-
term explanatory variable.   
At best, therefore, money appears as a supporting actor in theories of economic growth. Specifically, the 
latter have incorporated money mostly via two different ways: Sidrauski (1967) conceptualized money as 
a good that directly enters the utility function. In particular, he shows that under certain conditions on the 
utility function, money is super-neutral in the long run. Alternatively, there are the so-called “cash-in-
advance” models4, in which the medium-of-exchange function of money is made explicit (e.g., Lucas and 
Stokey, 1987). Of course, there are broad strands of literature refining these two approaches. Yet, what 
both have in common is that money is rather an add-on—a non-crucial variable that either supports or 
hampers other mechanisms perceived as more fundamental. So, money does not occupy a central role in 
explaining growth. Hence, Banerjee and Maskin’s above-cited dictum still seems to be appropriate in that 
the “money is neutral in the long run”-conviction builds on a theoretical framework that has relegated 
money to a minor role from the outset.   
Related to the mainstream’s concept of money is its perspective on interest: interest is considered a real 
phenomenon, representing individuals’ decisions how to allocate consumption over time. Specifically, 
standard growth theory models the interest rate as resulting from the decision of a representative 
individual whether to save or consume. The interest rate’s role for growth can be described as follows: 
interest mediates between the individual’s pure rate of time preference and the productivity of the capital 
stock. In case the capital stock’s marginal productivity is zero (i.e., no growth), the interest rate just equals 
the pure rate of time preference (Fisher, 1930; Ramsey, 1928). However, in case the capital stock is 
growing “[it] takes a bigger interest rate to persuade the household to save than it does just to persuade it 
not to borrow” (Aghion and Howitt, 2009, p. 35): saving needs to be large enough to also cover net 
investments.  
2 Already the classics considered money as neutral and quantity of money being regulated by production—see Marx’s agreement 
on that issue with Adam Smith (Marx, 1872, pp. 129–30, n. 23). 
3 It is, however, a unidirectional dichotomy: neutrality of money does not rule out the possibility that real variables affect nominal 
variables. 
4 In these models, it is assumed that money has to be held for a defined period of time before it can be spent. Their purpose is to 
include the costs of transferring wealth between assets (Orphanides and Solow, 1990). 
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Note the critical conceptual framing here: neoclassical economics sees interest and growth as independent 
of money. Both concepts are explained by certain characteristics of the capital stock (positive but 
diminishing returns on accumulation), individual preferences (saving vs. consuming) and technological 
progress as essential variables. Money is mostly irrelevant. Debt, a crucial category from other 
perspectives (cf. Section 2.3) is no relevant issue within the long-run money-growth nexus at all.  
Growth analyses from several other paradigms and theories are largely “money-free” as well. Some of the 
key growth aspects analyzed in the literature are: quality of institutions (North, 1990; Olson, 1982), 
expansion of market logic (Callon, 1998; Polanyi, 1944), conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899), 
norms/values/cultural change (e.g., Weber, 1920). All of the above lines of thought do not regard money 
as key variable of growth dynamics.  
However, the quintessence reproduced by most textbooks (e.g., Mankiw, 2009; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 
2010), that money is not relevant for growth in the long run, strangely contrasts with its widely 
acknowledged relevance for short-term dynamics of real economy (Fischer, 1974; López-Villavicencio 
and Mignon, 2011; Orphanides and Solow, 1990). It furthermore critically depends on which assumptions 
are made concerning marginal productivity of capital, the characteristics of economic agents, the 
distribution of seigniorage, the saving rate etc. (Orphanides and Solow, 1990) Thus it is openly admitted 
that only „for those who can bring themselves to accept the single-consumer, infinite-horizon, 
maximization model as a reasonable approximation to economic life, superneutrality is a defensible 
presumption. All others have to be ready for a different outcome” (ibid, p. 225). 
In the following, we present different strands of literature that partly include monetary aspects as main 
explanatory variables for economic growth. Some of these approaches prominently circulate within the 
degrowth-debate and, therefore, they will be analyzed in detail. 
2.2. Money, interest rate and growth 
Keynes’ liquidity preference theory of money and interest 
While in mainstream growth theory interest is always a real phenomenon, Keynes (1936) argued that it is 
primarily of monetary origin. He acknowledged that individual saving/consumption decisions may 
influence the interest rate, but he emphasized the individual’s subsequent decision in which form to hold 
savings. Here, individual preferences to hold liquid assets are crucial—hence the term liquidity preference 
to denote the desire to hold cash rather than less liquid yet interest-bearing assets. Consequently, Keynes 
defined interest as “the reward for parting with liquidity for a specified period” (Keynes, 1936, p. 167).  
This liquidity preference theory directly links interest to money: money is the most liquid asset. Liquidity 
is enables individuals to store wealth while retaining the ability to react to unforeseen events. In Keynes’s 
words, “… the importance of money essentially follows from its being a link between the present and the 
future” (Keynes, 1936, p. 293). While Keynes’s theory also refers to two further functions of money 
(transactions and speculation), it highlights uncertainty as an inherent feature of economic life and 
therefore stresses the precautionary aspect of holding money (Skidelsky, 2010). As individuals hold cash, 
they will always demand a minimum “reward for departing with liquidity”. This minimum is called the 
“liquidity premium”. It represents one of Keynes’s central tenets in that the liquidity premium induces a 
lower bound on interest rates. 
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Against this background, the question emerges how Keynes’s theory links money, interest and growth. 
Keynes assumed a set of interdependent variables that determine growth, including monetary aspects. 
Hence, he rejected the classical dichotomy between real and nominal variables as a “false division. … 
[For] as soon as we pass to the problem of what determines output and employment as a whole, we require 
the complete theory of a monetary economy” (Keynes, 1936, p. 293). Yet there are no simple causal links 
within this theory. For instance, the interest rate is only one among several growth determinants, which are 
“themselves complex and each is capable of being affected by prospective changes in the others” (Ibid, p. 
184).  
The fact that Keynes’s (1936) general theory does not build on simple causalities but unfolds a rather 
complex set of interdependent variables may explain why his theory has been used to back up a diversity 
of at times contradicting perspectives on monetary aspects of growth. In the following, we will set out 
some arguments that are especially prominent within the degrowth discourse. 
Positive interest rates as growth imperative? Some Keynes-influenced arguments 
Using different degrees of sophistication, several approaches eventually yield the same conclusion, 
namely that positive interest rates trigger an imperative for real economic growth. Loehr (2012) combines 
Keynes’s liquidity preference theory with the Golden Rule of capital accumulation (Phelps, 1961) from 
mainstream growth theory. Within the latter, the real interest rate equals the rate of capital stock’s 
productivity: a positive real interest rate means that capital is scarce and investments are profitable—the 
capital stock grows. In other words, zero growth is not possible as long as there is a positive interest rate. 
But if the interest rate “is always significantly higher than 0, due to the liquidity premium of money” 
(Loehr, 2012, p. 232), the economy continuously grows. Thus, the interest rate yields a monetary growth 
imperative. This perspective depicts the liquidity premium as a threshold that reverses causal relations: 
above the threshold, the productivity of the (real) capital stock determines the monetary interest rate, 
below the threshold the monetary interest rate determines the real interest rate and the rate of capital 
accumulation (Huth, 2002).  
Freydorf et al. (2012) and Wenzlaff et al. (2014) argue that the existence of positive interest rates alone is 
not sufficient to beget a growth imperative. Crucial is how creditors use the income they receive in the 
form of interest payments from debtors: if creditors fully consume their interest income, thereby re-
injecting it into the economy, a stable cycle without growth may endure. So, positive interest rates as such 
do not necessarily yield permanent growth. However, if creditors tend to hoard their income rather than to 
consume it, money is drawn from the cyclical interrelation of debtors, banks and creditors. In 
consequence, economic dynamics will eventually come to a standstill unless new money is fed into the 
economy. Pointing to the behavioral characteristics highlighted by Keynes (marginal propensity to 
consume decreases with income; liquidity preference leads to hoarding), Freydorf et al. (2012) and 
Wenzlaff et al. (2014) argue that the required spending behavior by creditors is rather unlikely. 
Accordingly, new money must be continuously injected into the economy so as to sustain the flow of 
economic relations. This nominal monetary growth, in turn, needs to be underpinned by real growth if 
financial crashes are to be avoided. 
In complete contrast to the above theories, the Post-Keynesian tradition of Lavoie (1984) argues against 
anything that could resemble a monetary growth imperative. Their perspective is decidedly heterodox in 
that it “rejects any formulation of neoclassical general equilibrium” (ibid, p. 772). Following their theory 
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of endogenous money, the latter is to be understood as the flow of credit from banks to entrepreneurs: 
“Money is introduced into the economy through the productive activities of the firms, as these activities 
generate income. There can be no money without production” (ibid, p. 774). For our purposes, the 
theory’s crucial aspect is that it says that money is not a stock (in the sense of being exogenously injected 
into the economy by central banks), but a flow. In consequence, interest payments (=flows) are very well 
compatible with situations of non-changing debts (=stocks). The above reasoning by Loehr (2012) and 
others thus needs to be dismissed on grounds of confusing flows and stocks (Cahen-Fourot, 2014): 
positive interest rates do not rule out a non-growing economy.  Interestingly, this Post-Keynesian 
perspective, while starting from a heterodox position, agrees with mainstream growth theory on one 
crucial issue: the growth of the economy determines the money supply, not the other way round! 
Positive interest rates as growth imperative—the easy way  
Within the degrowth debate, one can also encounter rather simplistic arguments positing an interest-
related growth imperative, which mostly rely on plausibility arguments. For example, Kennedy (2012) 
offers the following explanation: 1) households or firms that are indebted need not only to pay back the 
sum they borrowed but also interest; 2) overall money supply needs to grow accordingly; 3) if bubbles and 
financial crises are to be averted, real economic growth must follow. Similar statements often coincide 
with references to the work of Frederick Soddy (Soddy, 1934; see Daly, 1996), who famously considered 
“debt money” an evil, and involve concepts like “usurious interest”, believed to be the source of all evil in 
modern times (Kuzminski, 2013). This argument’s quintessence is that “the way money is created, bearing 
interest—so that debts have to be paid back in a way that demands unsupportable infinite growth—is a 
built-in driver of unsustainability in the economic system” (Boyle and Simms, 2009, p. 90). 
2.3. Heterodox approaches: “growth spiral” and the neglected role of debt  
The money-induced growth spiral 
In addition to the mainstream and Keynes-inspired analyses, there exist a number of heterodox approaches 
to the problem. One prominent example is Binswanger’s (2012, 2006) “growth spiral” theory5. 
Binswanger’s starting point is a critique of neoclassical economics’ treatment of money, which is imposed 
over a barter-like economy (the Walrasian general equilibrium theory; see above). While drawing upon 
the work of Keynes, he offers a different perspective on the role of money in the economy. According to 
Binswanger, fiat money was the necessary condition for the uptake of modern, steadily-growing economy 
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which continues to date. He emphasizes money’s role as a means 
of payment and focuses on the role of credit as advance money needed to produce in an economy based on 
specialization (he calls money a promoting factor of production). In his production model, a firm needs 
advance money to make an investment, i.e., to produce in one period what will be sold on the market in 
the next period6. This advance money can be provided either by owners of the firm (its shareholders) 
and/or by external finance (bank credits). As it is scarce, advance money has a price—interest in the case 
of credits and dividends in the case of shares. This means that the firm has to generate enough profit to 
5 An astonishingly similar argument can be found in Hixson (1991). Both authors seem, however, to have been unaware of each 
other’s work. Also, Douthwaite’s (1999) argumentation exhibits significant commonalities with Binswanger’s and Hixson’s. 
6 Ironically, even though Binswanger’s starting point is a critique of neoclassical economics for using money-less models of the 
economy and he claims that his model shows why money is important, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, in the simple one 
production facility-one household model, there is no need for money at all, as the provision of factors of production in advance 
could well be based on a contract, in which the later supply of produced goods would be guaranteed. We are thankful to Christian 
Klassert for pointing this out to us. 
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remunerate its shareholders and creditors. However, in the aggregate, there is only as much money in the 
system as was injected by firms when they bought factors of production: In Binswanger’s model, firms are 
also indirect creators of purchasing power for their own products.  
Thus, profits are not possible unless firms invest at least as much as their production from the preceding 
period is worth (including profits), an idea which can be traced back to the writings of numerous scholars, 
from David Hume to Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard Keynes, Joan Robinson and Kenneth Boulding 
(Hixson, 1991). In accordance with psychological research (Lindgren, 1991), Binswanger assumes that the 
owners of the factors of production accept money based on a value fiction—they believe that they will be 
able to soon buy tangible goods for that money (see also Hixson, 1991, p. 48). Of course, households also 
might use the interest income of banks to pay for the value added by the firm. But the argument has been 
made that banks have to keep a portion of their interest income as reserves to be able to expand credit in 
the future (Binswanger, 2009; Freydorf et al., 2012; Wenzlaff et al., 2014). Thus, as a consequence of the 
need to create demand for its own products and the alleged need of banks to keep some of its profits away 
from circulation, the firm is forced to demand more advance money in every period. As new credit-money 
again requires profit to enable the firms to pay back interest, this mechanism constitutes a growth 
imperative. Furthermore, according to Binswanger (and Hixson), this growth imperative makes the task of 
stabilizing the economy impossible: any attempt not to grow would in his model lead to a downward 
spiral, which would reduce the standard of living to the level of a subsistence or “Robinson Crusoe 
economy”7. 
Debt as growth imperative 
Another heterodox view on the role of money in a modern growth-economy focuses on its characteristic 
as debt (Malik, 1998). Two major proponents of this approach are Heinsohn and Steiger (2013, 1996). 
Quite similar to Binswanger, Heinsohn and Steiger’s theory starts by rejecting neoclassical analysis 
regarding the function and subsequently the status of money in modern societies. Acknowledging 
references to Keynes are another parallel. However, in the eyes of the authors, Keynes did not go far 
enough to unveil the true nature of money and thus its effects in modern economies. According to 
Heinsohn and Steiger, money is a key driver of growth. The way it works cannot be understood by models 
resting on the usual assumptions that money reduces transaction costs, stores wealth or satisfies 
precautionary motives. Rather, its essential features are its superior divisibility and its link to property 
rights. The second aspect relates to the assumption that money exists only in the form of debt, which 
requires property as security. Money therefore can exist only in a society with well-defined property-rights 
and with the right to burden and hypothecate property as the key aspect. Interest paid on credit 
compensates the creditor (bank) for having her property (reserves) “blocked” in a sense that this property 
cannot provide a security for loans to the creditor herself. 
How does this analysis of money relate to economic growth in real terms? Heinsohn and Steiger (2013) 
point to the fact that each production process starts with a firm asking a bank for a credit. Several aspects 
of the money-based credit transactions in societies with comprehensive property rights are important here: 
First, the repayment of credit inevitably includes interest payment. Second, as the precise settlement of 
debts in most cases requires a perfectly divisible good in order to meet the exact amount of credit plus 
7 A formal model showing the workings of the „growth spiral“ can be found in a recent publication of Binswanger’s son 
(Binswanger, 2009, p. 724): “A continuous credit expansion enables a continuous increase in aggregate spending, which in turn 
results in profits and, as long as firms operate successfully, continuous growth”. 
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interest, the repayment can only be realized in deposit money. This viewpoint corresponds to the historical 
analysis of Graeber (2012), who emphasizes that the invention of money has been both prerequisite for 
and origin of a debt-based economy. The reason is not that money lowers transaction costs but its 
precision regarding the settlement of debts. Thus our contemporary economy not only benefits from 
money but rather essentially requires it (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2013). Third, as credits have to be repaid 
together with interest, the aggregate output of all firms is forced to grow in order for them to be able to 
pay the interest. Note the crucial turn in the microeconomic reasoning here: Firms do not grow because 
they want to increase profit (which may be a nice side-effect) but because interest payment requires them 
to do so: “Neoclassical ideas like sacrificing consumption, which can be used to accumulate real capital or 
to increase productivity by accumulation of human capital, conveys the idyll of voluntariness not existing 
in a property-based economy” (Heinsohn and Steiger, 1996, p. 363). This argument resembles 
Binswanger’s (2012) distinction between growth imperative and growth impetus. Finally, with interest 
being interpreted as a phenomenon of property-rights, growth dynamics start only given a sufficient 
amount of correspondingly defined property, which, according to the authors, explains the absence of 
growth in tribal and feudal societies. De Soto’s work (2000) on missing property rights as a major cause of 
economic underdevelopment can be read as contemporary support for Heinsohn’s und Steigers’ thesis, 
which has also gained some attention from New Institutional Economics (Erlei et al., 2007, pp. 297–299). 
 
3. Comparison of money-growth nexus theories 
3.1. Of models and myths 
In the following, we need to make sense of the wide array of approaches presented in the last Section. 
Some approaches assert that monetary variables crucially influence economic growth, others deny this 
possibility. Interestingly, the cleavage does not exclusively run along the mainstream-heterodox divide. 
While standard textbooks quickly declare monetary aspects as irrelevant and relegate them to the realm of 
short-term business cycles, pertinent scholarly discussions are much more nuanced. It is no surprise, then, 
when a mainstream literature review concludes:  
““My main conclusion is that equally plausible models yield fundamentally different results”, wrote 
Jerome Stein in the introduction of his 1970 survey of monetary growth theory. Two decades later, all we 
have is more reasons for reaching the same conclusion.” (Orphanides and Solow, 1990, p. 224) 
This view seems all the more appropriate if heterodox approaches are considered as well. In particular, 
Keynes-influenced perspectives exhibit the whole range of growth-money relations: the Post-Keynesian 
endogenous money framework holds that no monetary growth imperative exists whereas other Keynes-
influenced scholars claim it does or that this is at least probable. 
One might say that we have to do here with myths (Holling et al., 2002) or, more neutrally, narratives. 
These are generalized descriptions of reality, which are not necessarily wrong, yet they do not reflect the 
whole “truth” of the matter. The danger of such narratives is that they might make us blind to the actual 
complexity of the real world—they are models, and models always have a limited domain (Musgrave, 
1981). Ignoring this limitation might lead to what Taleb (2010) calls the “narrative fallacy”, a tendency to 
impose patterns and relationships where there are none, at least given our limited set of available 
information and understanding. Put bluntly, “mere absence of nonsense may not be sufficient to make 
something true” (Taleb, 2010, p. 72). 
In a very stylized way, Table 1 displays the different approaches presented in the last section. In order to 
provide an accessible overview, Table 1 is not an all-encompassing list of theories; it rather contrasts the 
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economic textbook version of the irrelevance of monetary variables with the most prominent versions of 
monetary growth imperative hypotheses. 
Despite the wide variety of approaches, they exhibit the following features common to many theories in 
social science: 
• They deductively analyze relations between specific monetary aspects and economic growth. 
While the inductive formation of theories from case studies runs the risk of failing to grasp 
overarching patterns due to empirical complexity, these purely deductive approaches risk to 
neglect the diversity and nuances of social reality.  
• More specifically, the approaches tend to 1) abstract from allegedly irrelevant aspects for the 
sake of keeping the model manageable—aspects which nevertheless may play a significant 
role in reality; 2) they operate with causal links, which are socially contingent and thus 
plausible in some settings but not necessarily valid in others.  
• As a result, these theories rely on and promote distinct myths—in the colloquial sense of 
catchy stories that may or may not be true. These myths are closely entwined with the 
deductive model approaches: their specific analytical settings are to be rendered plausible and 
relevant via these story lines. In the end, this manufactured plausibility and the internal logical 
consistence, sometimes along with the formal elegance of a model may make us blind to 
deviant facts or alternative intuitions regarding the empirically elusive nature of the 
phenomena in question. 
While not methodologically harmful per se, these issues spell trouble if the myths disconnect from the 
modeling exercise. For instance, it seems perfectly legitimate to ignore monetary variables if the main 
analytical interest lies in deriving the conditions for technological progress as a determinant of growth. 
Yet this often comes with the notion of money as a lubricant, essentially neutral for matters of growth. 
And this is where it gets problematic: the justification for a specific modeling approach acquires a life of 
its own. No longer is money considered neutral within the specific model setting only, but inherently 
neutral. Standard growth theory continuously nurtures this myth—all the while, it is well-known that the 
formal proof behind the (long-run) neutrality-proposition can hardly be squared with reality (Orphanides 
and Solow, 1990, p. 225). 
In the following, we point out that each of the respective myths, while possibly containing some truth, is 
limited. The narratives should not mislead us to commit the fallacy of trying to reduce complex growth 
dynamics to one single issue. 
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Table 1 Overview of selected conceptual frameworks from the money-growth nexus literature 
 Standard growth 
theory 
Loehr Wenzlaff et al. Binswanger/Hixson Heinsohn/Steiger 
Theoretical approach / 
background 
Based either on Solow 
(1957) or on 
endogenous growth 
theory 
Combines neoclassical 
and Keynesian 
assumptions 
(Post-)Keynesian 
perspective  
Idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic (similar to 
New Institutional 
Economics) 
Perspective 
on interest 
Function Mediates between 
productivity of the 
capital stock and 
consumers’ pure rate of 
time preference 
Equilibrates demand for 
and supply of cash 
(Keynes 1936) 
 
Equilibrates demand for 
and supply of cash 
(Keynes 1936) 
 
Signalizes scarcity of 
credit (being its price) 
Compensation for 
departing with property 
premium during credit 
transaction 
Role for 
growth 
Interest resulting from 
growth (Ramsey-
Irving), not the other 
way around  
Rules out zero growth 
within the standard 
framework 
Growth imperative if 
interest income not fully 
re-injected 
Part of the growth 
imperative 
Growth imperative 
along with pursuit of 
profit 
Perspective 
on money 
Function • medium of 
exchange 
• store of value 
• unit of account 
 
• transactions 
• precaution 
• speculation 
• transactions 
• precaution 
• speculation 
• medium of 
exchange (central to 
explain money) 
• store of value 
• unit of account 
Precise debt settlement 
Role for 
growth 
No long-term impact: 
Money is neutral in the 
long run 
N.a. N.a. Real impact due to 
money illusion; fiat 
money made growth 
possible in the first 
place 
Real long-term impact: 
monetary interest = 
growth imperative 
Steady state feasible 
within the current 
system? 
Yes No Probably not No No 
Basic myth Money is a neutral medium of exchange  
Liquidity premium is a 
timeless fact   
Money is scarce Money is linked to 
property rights 
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3.2. Narrative limits 
“Money is a neutral medium of exchange”  
The economic textbook story of how money solves the difficulties of barter economies is one prime 
example of a myth—it has some truth to it, in that complex patterns of trade are unimaginable without the 
transaction-cost reducing function of money as a medium of exchange, yet it is very limited in scope. The 
medium-of-exchange narrative is flatly wrong if understood as an historical hypothesis about the 
emergence of money (e.g., Luo, 1998). Historical and anthropological evidence clearly demonstrates that 
money has originated within manifold religious, political and economic practices (e.g., Davies, 2002; 
Graeber, 2012). Humans have used an enormous variety of objects—among them, for instance, “…salt, 
thimbles, umiaks, vodka…” (Davies, 2002, p. 27)—to manage their social relations, whether it be settling 
feuds, arranging marriages or worshipping gods. Meanwhile, these objects evolved into some sort of 
(commodity) money. 
This is more than a matter of historical correctness. The medium-of-exchange narrative justifies the 
perspective of money as a lubricant without impact on real economic variables. Yet fundamental doubts 
about this neutrality assumption are warranted if one acknowledges the overwhelming evidence: money is 
and has always been a social institution. So what is growth theory missing? For instance, people regularly 
succumb to “money illusion”; that is, they base their decisions on nominal/monetary values rather than 
real variables, which entails “significant implications for economic theory” (Shafir et al., 1997, p. 341; see 
also Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, chap. 4). Again, this does not rule out assuming long-run neutrality in 
particular model settings, but it does preclude treating money as a neutral lubricant, regardless of the 
specific context. 
“Money is scarce”  
The arguments of Binswanger (2012), Binswanger (2009), Douthwaite (1999), Hixson (1991), Freydorf et 
al. (2012) and Wenzlaff et al. (2014) are closely related to each other and might be summarized under the 
narrative proposing that “money is scarce”. The growth imperative they all identify is related to the idea 
that there is not enough money in the market system to make profitable production possible in the 
aggregate—unless firms invest in every period, whereby the investments are effectively needed to 
“finance” the consumption of production from the preceding period. However, this analysis is based on a 
number of possibly problematic assumptions and corollaries: as already pointed out, Binswanger’s model 
does not seem to necessitate the existence of money in the first place; corporations finance a large fraction 
of their capital investments from retained earnings, while external financing accounts for less than a 
quarter of all capital expenditures in U.S. corporations at least (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014; Leary and 
Roberts, 2010); it is not entirely clear why interest income should be retained for any purpose in a 
stationary economy, as there would be no need for growing reserves to expand credit volume in the 
aggregate (see Section 2.3 for description of the relevant model); furthermore, credit-financed purchases 
of factors of production are not the only source of money in the system, as assumed in the Binswanger and 
related models—consumption credits could potentially close the alleged “demand gap”, even if the latter 
were to exist in the first place. Thus, while appealing prima facie, the “money is scarce” arguments draw 
much of their power from a rather questionable narrative. 
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 “The liquidity premium is a timeless fact” 
Loehr (2012) aims to analyze whether economies would (need to) grow even if other drivers of growth 
such as technological progress could be ruled out. Thus, Loehr wants to distill a monetary growth 
imperative independent of the political imperative to prevent unemployment in times of productivity rises. 
Indeed, Loehr (2012, p. 233) maintains that “even under the preconditions of cultural change, zero growth 
is not possible as long as a positive interest rate exists". While Loehr’s objective is analytically laudable 
and although he concedes that the “explanatory power” of his model is “certainly limited” (ibid, p. 234), 
the paper nurtures a myth about the origin of the interest rate.  
The narrative concerns the liquidity premium as origin of positive interest rates. Loehr’s claim that even 
under cultural change, the liquidity premium might prevent the transition to a sustainable, non-growing 
economy, misses the crucial point: the desired cultural change (humans prefer leisure and community over 
material wealth) would transform economic relations in a way that might entirely change the meaning of 
interest. In particular, such a transition towards a degrowth society might be similar to Keynes’s vision 
about the “economic possibilities for our grandchildren” (Keynes, 1930, p. 329): "The love of money as a 
possession—as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life—
will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-
pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease." This 
kind of cultural change would sharply diminish the liquidity premium (i.e., the motivation to hold money 
out of liquidity preference).  
“Money is based on private property” 
The particular property-rights-based monetary theory of Heinsohn and Steiger (2013) claims an 
inseparable connection between private property, money and growth. This narrative builds on the notion 
of property being a requisite for receiving credit. The microcredit-movement clearly demonstrates this 
link, as it tackles the problem of people not possessing enough property to acquire credit. Most people 
being asked to provide securities in order to receive a bank credit will find this perfectly plausible. At the 
same time, this narrative is limited for two reasons. First, it abstracts from the fact that the link between 
property and credit-money is rather loose in monetary systems operating with fiat money. That is, the 
amount of property purchasable with credit money is by far not equivalent to the amount of property 
necessary to receive the respective credit (cf. Admati and Hellwig, 2013). Second, property understood as 
a requisite to receive credit turns out to be a rather elusive concept if we think of risk capital invested in 
start-up firms with basically nothing more than a promising idea, labor power which evidently enables us 
to receive credit-generated money or money created via issuance of government bonds apparently backed 
by the fiscal competency of the state only. Thus the connection between property and money becomes so 
vague that it is far from trivial to delineate, as Heinsohn and Steiger do in a de facto normative analysis, 
“good”, property-based money from “bad”, purely fiat money. In the end, though their theory sheds some 
light on the emergence of modern growth economies, it is quite questionable whether the right to burden 
or hypothecate property can be regarded as a crucial variable in the current economic system. 
“Positive interest rates are incompatible with a non-growing economy” 
The narrative of monetary interest forcing the economy to grow revolves around the conclusion that 
positive aggregate interest can be paid only in a growing economy, a conclusion that is implicitly assumed 
obvious and thus noncontroversial and not requiring a justification. In a relatively more sophisticated 
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argumentation, Loehr (2012, p. 234) opines that a zero interest rate is “an important necessary condition 
for a zero-growth steady state” (see above). Others (Boyle and Simms, 2009; Kennedy, 2012; Kuzminski, 
2013) rely on plausibility arguments to reach a similar conclusion.  
Yet, alternative theories regard positive interest rates and non-growing economies very well reconcilable 
(Cahen-Fourot, 2014). In a stationary system positive and negative interest payments would have to cancel 
each other out. Interest, then, is considered a zero-sum-game where one’s gain is another one’s loss. The 
existence of interest in earlier stationary societies clearly demonstrates that interest has not always 
reflected the rate of capital accumulation throughout the greater part of history: humans have charged one 
another interest even before the ascent of writing, in fact, they did so about 2000 years before the ascent of 
money (Homer and Sylla, 2005), and within the most diverse cultural arrangements. This suggests that we 
consider the “nature” of interest, i.e., its economic determination base as well as its effects (like 
implications for growth), as a historically contingent social institution: In a “culture of growth”, where 
positive real interest rates are taken as natural, monetary interest reflects growth rates simply because the 
society connects these two phenomena up to the point where they seem identical. As a result, within this 
framing interest payments may indeed depend on an ever increasing capital stock. However, that interest 
rates reflect an amalgam of our rate of time preference regarding consumption and capital productivity is 
no law of nature but merely a social convention. In another “economic culture”, other aspects such as 
liquidity preference or even other factors may determine interest rates (real and nominal), maybe triggered 
by the circumstance that the material size of the economy is stable. A monetary growth imperative 
therefore exists (if at all) only insofar as the cultural habit of linking monetary interest to growth persists 
and only as long as the features of our economy enable this cultural habit. 
4. Discussion  
4.1. Theoretical challenges 
As Dittmer (2015, p. 15) rightly observes, “[t]he debt-money growth imperative […] has yet to be 
rigorously shown to exist”. The theoretical claim to identify an imperative sets the bar very high; in our 
view, none of the presented theories convincingly meets this challenge. At the same time, rejecting 
specific claims does not disprove the conjecture of a monetary growth imperative in general—let alone 
imply that money is neutral. So there is a difference between i) stating that the current configuration of 
financial systems contributes to the growth paradigm and ii) claiming that inherent causal relations have 
been identified. David Hume famously cautioned against premature causal inferences which, all too often, 
arise out of custom only (Hume, 1748). It is no wonder, then, that myth-creation and narrative fallacies 
blossom under the shade of a multicolored theoretical spectrum. Myths may contribute to new theoretical 
insights by inciting new research programs (Holling et al., 2002), yet they may lead to theoretical 
parochialism, thereby sidelining alternative perspectives. Critical paradigmatic assumptions must be 
reflected more rigorously so as to account for the diversity and contingency of social phenomena. Also, 
each founding narrative must lead to concise empirical hypotheses. Otherwise, it rather inhibits than 
advances understanding of the complex relationship between monetary variables and economic growth. 
Specific empirical questions will need to be addressed in order to ground an oftentimes lofty discussion.  
The social nature of money implies that the one theory, which explains all of money’s aspects including 
its effects on economic growth, may be elusive: “[M]oney has no essence. It is not “really” anything; 
therefore, its nature has always been and presumably always will be a matter of political contention” 
(Graeber, 2012, p. 372). In line with this reasoning, Davies’s “metatheory of money” (2002, p. 29ff.) 
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argues against the urge to choose between contradictory theories of money. Rather, the popularity of 
competing theories over time should be expected to oscillate between extremes. Against this background, 
it would appear that the impact of monetary variables on growth constitutes an equally open matter. 
4.2. Practical consequences for the degrowth movement 
Given this unsettled theoretical situation, what practical lessons can the degrowth movement draw? The 
bottom-line is that any efforts to “abolish” money and interest, so as to eliminate (potential) monetary 
growth imperatives (e.g., Douthwaite, 2012), are, most likely, futile anyway: “…a complex industrialized 
society, even with a dramatically reduced material throughput, will find it impossible to function without 
some form of money” (Kallis et al., 2013, p. 101). Again, consider the wide variety of cultural forms in 
which money and interest have appeared. For instance, foods and animals were used as money “in Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, America, India, and China before town civilizations developed” (Homer and Sylla, 2005, p. 
20). And in the medieval ages, though interest taking was banned by the Catholic Church as “usury”, it 
was, nevertheless, commonly practiced (Davies, 2002). In consequence, the transition to a post-growth 
economy might well transform rather than abolish monetary institutions. While financial markets have 
seen their well-deserved share of bad press, their two original main functions, that is, providing insurance 
against risks and facilitating intertemporal consumption transfers, are, in principle, beneficial, even from a 
degrowth perspective. So the task would be to create a culture that restricts money and interest to their 
appropriate roles. 
Recently, two proposals have surged as possible solutions: communal currencies and 100%-money. It 
seems ironic, however, that the degrowth community debates concepts which have originally been 
suggested as ways towards fostering growth. Consider, firstly, the calls for communal or regional 
currencies (e.g., Boyle and Simms, 2009; Kallis et al., 2012; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013). Prominent 
real-world examples such as the one in Wörgl (Austria) in the 1930s were actually successful means to re-
launch regional growth in the Great Recession. Also, many such proposals are implicitly or explicitly 
inspired by the work of Silvio Gesell, whose original ideas were also meant to foster economic activity 
(Gesell, 1916). Nonetheless, as Loehr’s (2012) support demonstrates, Gesell’s ideas to eliminate interest 
rates are currently en vogue. Secondly, 100% money (i.e., banks are not allowed to create new money out 
of the void, they can only lend out previously attracted savings8) was originally proposed and supported 
by neoclassical economists such as Irving Fisher (1935) and Milton Friedman (1959). Current cleavages 
do not sort along the mainstream/heterodox divide: in both camps, there are supporters as well as 
opponents. Dittmer (2015) provides an enlightening overview on common arguments in favor and against 
100% money. 
 
Arguably, the search for post-growth compatible financial institutions is just beginning. Technological 
innovations might, in principle, contribute to the desired transition. For instance, the “new technologies of 
peer-to-peer economic activity are potentially powerful tools for building a social movement of sharing 
and cooperation”—keeping in mind that “technologies are only as good as the political and social context 
in which they are employed” (Schor, 2014): whether money’s dominating function in mediating exchange 
would emerge strengthened or weakened is not predetermined. Likewise, electronic currencies may either 
induce speculative bubbles or simplify complex economic calculations (Shiller, 2014). 
8 In fact, this is how the monetary system is modelled in many basic economic models, which are based on the assumption that 
investment (must) equal savings (I=S). The current monetary system has little in common with that (McLeay et al., 2014). 
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Interestingly, a growth imperative is mostly posited in the context of money, as if there were no others. 
One may well wonder, however, why other “growth drivers” (another related term from the degrowth 
literature) are not considered “imperatives” (cf. Sorrell, 2010). Are cultural factors, such as conspicuous 
consumption and positional competition (Hirsch, 1976), not forcing the economy to grow? What about 
institutional factors, such as growth-oriented social security systems, or political-economic factors, such as 
the tendency to solve distributional conflicts via growth instead of controversial redistribution? There 
seems to be no coherent reason to deny these the status of growth imperatives, as they are deeply 
embedded “mechanisms” in the current structure of socio-economic systems, which, within this structure 
at least, appear unavoidable. Assuming that monetary aspects are only one amongst a number of growth 
drivers and imperatives, the question becomes one of prioritization. Binswanger (2012), for instance, 
argues that institutional drivers such as growth-oriented social security systems are by far easier to 
overcome than monetary ones. Yet there seems to be no compelling reason ruling out the reverse. As we 
have been at pains to point out, money and interest are social institutions and, as such, amenable to 
change. Where and how to best trigger cultural change is another story. 
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